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Summary – Foreign investors are often skeptical toward the quality of the domestic 
institutions and the enforceability of the law in developing countries. Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs) guarantee certain standards of treatment that can be 
enforced via binding investor-to-state dispute settlement outside the domestic juridical 
system. Developing countries accept restrictions on their sovereignty in the hope that 
the protection from political and other risks leads to an increase in foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which is also the stated purpose of BITs. We provide the first 
rigorous quantitative evidence that a higher number of BITs raises the FDI that flows 
to a developing country. This result is very robust to changes in model specification, 
estimation technique and sample size. There is also some limited evidence that BITs 
might function as substitutes for good domestic institutional quality, but this result is 
not robust to different specifications of institutional quality. 
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2 1. INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) in order to attract more 
foreign direct investment (FDI). In recent decades BITs have become ‘the most 
important international legal mechanism for the encouragement and governance’ of 
FDI (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2004, p. 0). The preambles of the thousands of 
existing BITs state that the purpose of BITs is to promote the flow of FDI and, 
undoubtedly, BITs are so popular because policy makers in developing countries 
believe that signing them will increase FDI. But do these treaties fulfill their stated 
purpose and attract more FDI to developing countries that submit to the obligations of 
a BIT? Despite the large and increasing number of BITs concluded, there exists very 
little evidence answering this question. Most existing scholarship, typically written 
with a legal perspective, simply restricts itself to an analysis of the BIT practice of 
one country or certain similar provisions in a range of BITs (Vandevelde 1996, p. 
545). This omission is strange given that the question is of great importance to 
developing countries. They invest time and other scarce resources to negotiate, 
conclude, sign and ratify BITs. Such treaties represent a non-trivial interference with 
the host countries’ sovereignty as they provide protections to foreign investors that are 
enforceable via binding investor-to-state dispute settlement. While the motivations 
driving developing countries to incur these costs may be varied (see Guzman 1998; 
Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2004; Neumayer 2005), the costs might be justified if 
the ultimate outcome is an increase in the inward flow of FDI.
1 But is this what 
actually occurs? 
In the absence of hard, quantitative evidence, some observers have been rather 
pessimistic toward the effect of BITs on FDI location. Sornarajah (1986, p. 82), for 
example, suggests that ‘in reality attracting foreign investment depends more on the 
3 political and economic climate for its existence rather than on the creation of a legal 
structure for its protection’. An expert group meeting sponsored by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1997 reportedly held a 
similar position (Raghavan 1997). Supportive of this view is that some major hosts of 
FDI like Brazil or Mexico for a long time were reluctant to sign BITs. As UNCTAD 
(1998, p. 141) has put it in a review of BITs from almost a decade ago: ‘There are 
many examples of countries with large FDI inflows and few, if any, BITs.’ And yet, 
most developing countries have signed a great many BITs by now. Is there evidence 
that those that have signed more BITs have also managed to attract more FDI? 
Two studies analyze this issue over the period 1980 to 2000 (Hallward-Driemeier 
2003 and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005) and one over the period 1991 to 2000 
(Salacuse and Sullivan 2005). The first study by Hallward-Driemeier (2003) does not 
find any statistically significant effect. The second study by Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman (2005) finds a negative effect at high levels of risk and a positive effect 
only at low levels of risk, with the majority of developing countries falling into the 
high risk category. The third study by Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) finds a positive 
effect only for United States BITs, but not for BITs from other countries of the 
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The existing 
evidence goes against expectation and would suggest that the enormous amount of 
effort developing countries have spent on BITs has basically been wasted. One of the 
problems of existing studies is that they infer results from a rather restricted sample of 
countries (31 and 63, respectively) or are based on cross-sectional regressions. In 
contrast, we employ a much larger panel over the period 1970 to 2001, covering up to 
119 countries. Importantly, we find a positive effect of BITs on FDI inflows that is 
consistent and robust across various model specifications. The effect is sometimes 
4 conditional on institutional quality, but is always positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero at all levels of institutional quality. To our 
knowledge, we provide the first hard evidence that there is a payoff to developing 
countries’ willingness to incur the costs of negotiating BITs and to succumb to the 
restrictions on sovereignty contained therein. 
Having demonstrated that BITs successfully increase the flow of FDI coming to a 
country, another important question that we address is whether BITs function as 
substitutes or complements to good institutional quality. Naturally, one would expect 
them to be substitutes, i.e. they provide security and certain standards of treatment to 
foreign investors where domestic institutions fail to deliver the same security and 
standards. However, some, like Hallward-Driemeier (2003) argue that BITs might 
only be seen as credible in an environment of good institutional quality. This would 
imply that BITs are most effective in countries where they are least needed. Our 
results provide some limited evidence that BITs might function as substitutes to poor 
institutional quality, which would suggest that they are most effective where such 
quality is low and that they are most successful where they are needed most. 
However, this result is not robust to different specifications of institutional quality. 
This article is structured as follows. The next section briefly describes the well-
known fact of increasing importance of foreign investment to developing countries, 
illustrates the growth of BITs and analyzes the role of their main provisions for the 
promotion of FDI. We then review the three existing empirical studies and discuss 
their shortcomings, which we aim to overcome in our own analysis. After presenting 
our research design, we report results and test the sensitivity of results to important 
changes in model specification. The final section concludes. 
 
5 2. BITS AND FDI 
The flow of FDI has dramatically increased in the past several decades to become a 
major force in the worldwide allocation of funds and technology. Prior to 1970, world 
trade generally grew at a greater pace than that of FDI, but in the decades since then 
the flow of FDI has grown at more than twice the pace of the growth of worldwide 
exports. By the early 1990s, the sales of worldwide exports would be eclipsed by the 
sales of foreign affiliates of multi-national firms (Dunning 1998). Not only has the 
flow of FDI increased worldwide, but the importance of FDI as a source of funds to 
developing countries in particular has also significantly increased. Private 
international flows of financial resources have become increasingly important to 
developing countries. In the 1980s tight budgets, the debt crisis and an overall 
decreased interest in providing traditional development aid lead to a decline in official 
development assistance from the developed world. When capital flows to developing 
nations began to rise again in the latter part of that decade, the flows would 
increasingly be composed of FDI (Zebregs 1998). Only very recently have aid flows 
slightly increased again in the wake of the so-called Monterrey Consensus. However, 
in 2003 FDI was the largest component of the net resource flows to developing 
countries and this is bound to remain the case for some time to come (UNCTAD 
2003a). Although the developed countries remain both the dominating source and the 
major recipient of FDI, their dominance has decreased over time with developing 
countries in 2003 receiving almost 31% of FDI as opposed to only about 20% in the 
1980s (UNCTAD 2004). Indeed, FDI inflows per unit of GDP are much higher in 
many developing countries than in developed ones (ibid.).  It was during this same 
period that BITs were introduced and eventually proliferated and in light of the 
6 importance of FDI, particularly to developing nations, the extent to which these two 
phenomena are causally related warrants careful scrutiny. 
The first BITs appeared at the end of the 1950s. Some trace their history back to 
the treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation (FCN) concluded by the United 
States over centuries (Salacuse 1990). The FCN treaties had the expansion of 
international trade and the improvement of US foreign relations as their prime 
purpose, even though some investment provisions were later added (Guzman 1998). 
BITs on the other hand are more clearly focused on foreign investment protection. 
Germany, having lost almost all of her foreign investment during the Second World 
War, signed the very first BIT with Pakistan in 1959. After that, it took almost two 
decades before BITs gained momentum. By the end of the 1960s there were 75 
treaties, which rose to 167 by the end of the 1970s and to 389 by the end of the 1980s. 
The number of BITs worldwide began to grow rapidly in the 1990s and by 2002 there 
would be 2,181 BITs worldwide (UNCTAD 2003a). Figure 1 shows the number of 
BITs signed per year and the cumulative number of BITs worldwide. 
In order to explain the popularity of bilateral investment treaties it is necessary to 
understand how they fit into the larger regime of state-foreign investor relations. Prior 
to the advent of BITs, the only protection for foreign investors was the customary 
international legal rule of minimum standard of treatment and the so-called Hull rule. 
The minimum standard of treatment rule provides only very minimal protection, as 
the name already suggests, while the Hull rule dealt exclusively with cases of 
expropriation and therefore provided no general protection against discriminatory 
treatment. It grew out of a dispute between Mexico and the US in the 1930s over 
properties expropriated by the government of Mexico. In one of a series of diplomatic 
notes to the Mexican Minister of Foreign Affairs, the US Secretary of State Cordell 
7 Hull stated that ‘no government is entitled to expropriate private property, for 
whatever purpose, without provision for prompt, adequate, and effective payment 
therefore’ (Guzman 1998, p. 641). Subsequently, the rule of “prompt, adequate, and 
effective” compensation would be the standard known as the Hull rule. However, it is 
disputed whether the Hull rule represents customary international law. Developing 
countries challenged its validity as part of their demands for a New International 
Economic Order with some success: Resolution 1803 of the United Nations General 
Assembly merely requires ‘appropriate compensation’ for expropriation (Ginsburg 
2004). Guzman (1998, p. 641) suggests that by the mid-1970s ‘the Hull Rule had 
ceased to be a rule of customary international law’, if ever it had been one. The fact 
that there were several spectacular expropriations in the 1960s and 1970s taking place 
without what investors regarded as adequate compensation supports this view.
2 This 
raises doubt on whether the Hull rule ever represented customary international law, 
for which conforming state practice is a requirement. 
Surprisingly, even as many developing nations resisted the Hull Rule, many of the 
same countries began to sign on to BITs that incorporate similar and indeed more far-
reaching provisions. Guzman (1998) and Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2004) 
suggest that this seemingly contradictory behavior is explained by the increased 
competition among developing countries for FDI from developed countries. 
Collectively, they would be better off refusing to sign any BIT and retaining as much 
control over their assets as possible, which explains their resistance to multilateral 
investment treaties at fora such as the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) where they can collectively express and organize their 
interests. In a classic example of the prisoner’s dilemma, however, the individual 
country benefits from being able to provide credible commitments to investors. In the 
8 context of limited multilateral or customary protection for investors, the individual 
country gains a competitive advantage as an investment location by submitting to a 
BIT. Further, when a less developed country’s neighbor or economic competitor signs 
such an agreement, in order to remain competitive they must sign one as well.  
Somewhat at odds with this explanation is that the latest trend is for developing 
countries to sign BITs among themselves. This has been a rather recent development, 
however, and the vast majority of existing BITs are concluded between a developed 
and a developing country. 
The basic provisions of a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) typically guarantee 
certain standards of treatment for the foreign investor (see Dolzer and Stevens 1995; 
UNCTAD 1998). By entering into a BIT, signatories agree to grant certain relative 
standards treatment such as national treatment (foreign investors may not be treated 
any worse than national investors, but may be treated better and, in fact, often are) and 
most-favored nation treatment (privileges granted to one foreign investor must be 
granted to all foreign investors). They also agree to guarantee certain absolute 
standards of treatment such as fair and equitable treatment for foreign investors in 
accordance with international standards after the investment has taken place. BITs 
typically ban discriminatory treatment against foreign investors and include 
guarantees of compensation for expropriated property or funds, and free transfer and 
repatriation of capital and profits. Further, the BIT parties agree to submit to binding 
dispute settlement should a dispute concerning these provisions arise (UNCTAD 
1998). Ostensibly, these provisions should secure some of the basic requirements for 
credible protection of property and contract rights that foreign investors look for in 
host countries. They should also protect foreign investors against political and other 
risks highly prevalent in many developing countries. Far from being neutral, foreign 
9 investors are often granted higher security and better treatment than domestic 
investors (Vandevelde 1998).  
The basic provisions of BITs are all direct answers to the fundamental “hold-up” 
or “dynamic inconsistency” problem that faces developing nations attempting to 
attract FDI. The dynamic inconsistency problem arises from the fact that although 
host countries have an incentive to promise fair and equitable treatment beforehand in 
order to attract foreign investment, once that investment is established and investors 
have sunk significant costs the host country’s incentive is to exploit or even 
expropriate the assets of foreign investors. Even those host countries that are willing 
to forego taking advantage in these circumstances will find it very difficult to credibly 
commit to their position. Many developing countries have adopted domestic legal 
changes over the last decade or so with a view toward encouraging a greater FDI 
inflow (UNCTAD 2004). However, these domestic legal rules cannot substitute for 
the commitment device offered by entering into a legally binding bilateral treaty. 
BITs, and their binding investor-to-state dispute settlement provision in particular, are 
meant to overcome the dilemma facing host countries who are willing to denounce 
exploiting foreign investors after the investment has already been undertaken. 
Interestingly, at the same time as BITs flourished in the 1980s and 1990s, outright 
expropriations of foreign investors, which were common during the 1960s and 1970s, 
practically ceased to take place (Minor 1994). 
The extent of interference with domestic regulatory sovereignty developing 
countries succumb to in signing BITs is enormous. In fact, virtually any public policy 
regulation can potentially be challenged through the dispute settlement mechanism as 
long as it affects foreign investors. Often, foreign investors need not have exhausted 
domestic legal remedies and can thus bypass or avoid national legal systems, reaching 
10 straight for international arbitration, where they can freely choose one of the three 
panelists, their consensus is needed for one other panelist and where they can expect 
that the rules laid out in the BITs are fully applied (Peterson 2004). This contrasts 
with domestic courts, where investors have no say on the composition of judges and 
where domestic rules might trump BIT provisions. BITs have been criticized for not 
conforming to a truly liberal economic model by failing to ban distorting government 
policies such as protective tariffs or tax incentives for foreign investors (Vandevelde 
2000). However, even critics such as Vandevelde (2000, p. 499) admit that ‘BITs 
seriously restrict the ability of host states to regulate foreign investment’.
3 In 
concluding BITs, developing countries are therefore ‘trading sovereignty for 
credibility’ (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2004, p. 4). 
BITs are therefore an important instrument of protection to foreign investors, for 
which there is currently not much legal alternative. Only few regional free trade 
agreements contain investment protection provisions like the North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on 
Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement) imposes only rudimentary 
disciplines on the regulation of foreign investment that are by far not as 
comprehensive as and fall much short of provisions contained in BITs. 
Of course, not all BITs are identical in their provisions. Some developed country 
investors like the United States insist on some limited rights of its investors to 
establish investment in host countries in the first place, whereas investor’s rights in 
most BITs are restricted to fair and equitable treatment after the investment has 
already taken place and provide no right of entrance. United States BITs often 
prohibit certain performance requirements such as local content, export and 
employment requirements beyond the requirements contained in the WTO’s TRIMs 
11 Agreement, whereas BIT programs of other developed countries do not contain such 
provisions (Vandevelde 1998). Conversely, some non-developed countries such as 
China and Eastern European countries have successfully managed to restrict the 
compulsory dispute settlement provisions to disputes concerning expropriation or the 
compensation thereof (Peters 1996, p. 107). However, by and large BITs tend to be 
rather similar in their provisions. 
BITs are also unlikely to be identical in their effect on incoming FDI flows. In 
principle, BIT provisions only protect investors from the signatory states to whom 
binding commitments are made.
4 One would therefore expect that signing a BIT with 
a major capital exporter such as Germany or the United States has a larger impact on 
FDI inflows than signing a BIT with minor capital exporters such as New Zealand or 
Portugal. However, the signing of BITs sends out a signal to potential investors that 
the developing country is generally serious about the protection of foreign investment. 
The encouragement of FDI flows therefore need not be restricted to investors from 
developed countries that are BIT partners of the developing country. Instead, BITs 
can have positive spill-over effects. How important is the signaling effect, which 
benefits investors from all countries, compared to the commitment effect, which only 
relates to investors from BIT partner countries, is difficult to say. Our research design, 
described in detail below, does not restrict the effect of BIT signature on FDI to 
investment from partner countries and accounts for differences in the size of potential 
FDI to which the developing country has made binding commitments by weighting 
BITs with the relative importance of the developed country partner as a capital 
exporter. 
 
12 3. REVIEW OF OTHER STUDIES 
It is most astonishing that despite the rising number of BITs, there are only three other 
serious studies examining the effect of such treaties on the location of FDI.
5 The first 
study has been undertaken by Hallward-Driemeier (2003), looking at the bilateral 
flow of FDI from 20 OECD countries to 31 developing countries over the period 1980 
to 2000. Her research design is dyadic, consisting of up to 537 country pairs. Using 
fixed effects estimations, she finds that the existence of a BIT between two countries 
does not increase the flow of FDI from the developed to the developing signatory 
country. This is true whether the dependent variable is measured as absolute flows, 
flows divided by host country’s GDP or the share of the source countries’ FDI 
outflow. Interacting the BIT variable with various measures of institutional quality, 
she finds a positive coefficient of the interaction term that is often statistically 
significant. This would suggest that, contrary to theoretical expectations, BITs are 
complements to good institutional quality and therefore do not perform their original 
function, namely to provide guarantees to foreign investors in the absence of good 
domestic institutional quality. 
In the second study, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) analyze the impact of BITs 
on general non-dyadic FDI inflows, also in a panel from 1980 to 2000, but with data 
averaged over five-year periods, covering 63 countries. Whilst both studies draw upon 
data provided by International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), Hallward-Driemeier 
(2003) uses individual components of institutional quality, whereas Tobin and Rose-
Ackerman (2005) use the aggregate political risk measure, which includes many more 
components than institutional quality, including some that are not directly related to 
political risk (such as, among others, religious and ethnic tensions, armed conflict and 
socio-economic conditions such as unemployment and poverty). In a fixed effects 
13 model, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman find that a higher number of BITs either in total or 
signed with a high income country lowers the FDI a country receives as a share of 
global FDI flows at high levels of risk and raises the FDI only at low levels of risk. In 
an additional dyadic analysis of 54 countries, they fail to find any statistically 
significant effect of BITs signed with the US on FDI flows from the US to developing 
countries, either conditionally on the level of political risk or unconditionally. 
The third study provides three cross-sectional analyses of FDI inflows to up to 99 
developing countries in the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, respectively, as well as a 
fixed effects estimation of the bilateral flow of FDI from the US to 31 developing 
countries over the period 1991 to 2000. Salacuse and Sullivan (2005) find the 
signature of a BIT with the US to be associated with higher FDI inflows in both types 
of estimations, whereas the number of BITs with other OECD countries is always 
statistically insignificant. 
The three studies suffer from a number of shortcomings that we try to improve on 
in our own study. Halward-Driemeier’s (2003) model presumes that a BIT will only 
have an effect on the flow of FDI from one developed country, namely the signatory, 
to the developing country. However, this presumption neglects the signaling effect of 
BITs (Elkins, Guzman and Simmons 2004, p. 21). As pointed out in the preceding 
section, in concluding a BIT, the developing country commits to protect foreign 
investments, explicitly only the FDI from the signatory developed country, but 
implicitly it also signals its willingness to protect all foreign investment. There are 
therefore likely to be positive spill-over effects from signing a BIT. Halward-
Driemeier’s modeling cannot capture the potential of BITs to attract more FDI from 
other developed non-signatory countries as well, and consequently may underestimate 
the effect that signing a BIT has on the inward flow of FDI. In addition to not 
14 capturing this potentially important spill-over effect, the dyadic design also has 
another major disadvantage. Data on bilateral FDI flows are very sparse, and 
consequently the size of her sample is significantly limited by this choice. A sample 
of 31 developing countries is everything but representative. Similar arguments apply 
to Salacuse and Sullivan’s (2005) fixed effects analysis.
6 Our own study draws from a 
much larger and more representative sample. 
Where Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) do not use a dyadic research design, the 
paucity of bilateral FDI flow data does not impose a binding constraint on sample 
size. Nevertheless, for no clear reason their sample consists of only 63 countries. In 
comparison, our own sample is both deeper and wider. It covers the period 1970, the 
first year for which UNCTAD provides FDI data, to 2001, the last year for which we 
have available data. It also covers up to 119 developing countries, which amounts to a 
much more representative sample. The countries included in our sample are listed in 
appendix 1. Salacuse and Sullivan’s (2005) cross-sectional analysis also has the 
advantage of a large sample size. However, by definition this type of analysis cannot 
control for country-specific unobserved heterogeneity, which is likely to be important, 
nor does it exploit the full information available from looking at FDI flows over a 
longer time period. 
 
4. RESEARCH DESIGN 
(a) Dependent variable 
As our main measure of FDI attractiveness, we use the absolute amount of FDI going 
to a developing country, converted to constant US$ of 1996 with the help of the US 
GDP deflator. The definition of a developing country follows World Bank 
classification. We use absolute FDI flows because if one were to use FDI inflow as a 
15 percentage of host country’s GDP instead, the measure would capture changes in the 
relative importance of foreign investment to the host country, but not changes in 
inflows directly. Quite possibly, the worldwide increase in the rate of the conclusion 
of BITs is partly responsible for the increase in overall FDI going to developing 
countries. However, there is always the danger that one finds a statistically significant 
relationship between two upward trending variables that is spurious. We deal with this 
potential problem in two ways. First, we employ year dummies to account for any 
year-to-year variation in total FDI flows unaccounted for by our explanatory 
variables, which should mitigate potential spuriousness of any significant results. 
Second, as an alternate dependent variable to the absolute amount of FDI we use the 
FDI inflow a country receives relative to the sum of FDI going to developing 
countries. Since this variable is not trending over time no year-specific time dummies 
are included in these sets of estimations. FDI inflow as a share of developing country 
FDI as the dependent variable captures the relative attractiveness of developing 
countries as hosts for FDI and explicitly allows for competition amongst them for a 
fixed sized cake of FDI to be divided.
7 Ideally, one would like to disaggregate FDI 
flows according to economic sectors. Unfortunately, no comprehensive information is 
available for a large panel of countries. 
We take the natural log of the dependent variable to reduce the skewness of its 
distribution. This increases the model fit substantially. To do so, we need to recode a 
small number of negative FDI flows. Negative FDI flows essentially imply ‘instances 
of reverse investment or disinvestment’ (UNCTAD 2001, p. 292). In our analysis we 
set negative FDI flows equal to positive FDI flows of one US$. If instead one were to 
discard all negative flows then results are hardly affected. 
 
16 (b) Explanatory variables 
Our main explanatory variable is the cumulative number of BITs a developing 
country has signed with OECD countries, weighted by the share of outward FDI flow 
the OECD country accounts for relative to total world outward FDI flow.
8 The 
weighting is to account for differences in the size of potential FDI a developing 
country makes protection commitments for via signing a BIT. We exclude BITs 
signed between developing countries since FDI flows between developing countries 
are rare. Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) do not weight the cumulative BIT variable 
by the share of outward FDI flow of the developed country partner, but our results are 
similar if we include the unweighted BIT variable instead.
9 They also take the natural 
log of the cumulative BIT variable. We keep the variable in its level form, not least 
because the log of zero (BITs) is undefined. 
Our control variables are very similar to the ones used by Halward-Driemeier 
(2003) and Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005). They are also among the ones more 
consistently found to be determinants of FDI flows (Chakrabarti 2001). We include 
the natural log of per capita income, the log of total population size and the economic 
growth rate as indicators of market size and market potential (data from World Bank 
2003).
10 Developing countries, which have concluded a free trade agreement with a 
developed country, might receive more FDI as it is easier to export goods back into 
the developed or other countries. Such agreements sometimes also contain provisions 
on policies that might be beneficial to foreign investors. We account for this with a 
dummy variable indicating whether a country is a member of the World Trade 
Organization as well as a variable counting the number of bilateral trade agreements a 
developing country has concluded with the US, the European Community/European 
Union or Japan, based on information contained in WTO (2004) and EU (2004).
11 
17 The inflation rate is a proxy variable for macroeconomic stability. In sensitivity 
analysis we also included trade openness and the secondary enrollment ratio, but these 
two variables are not included in the main analysis due to loss of observations 
following their inclusion. Data are taken from World Bank (2003a). We employ a 
measure of natural resource intensity to control for the fact that, all other things equal, 
large natural resources are a major attractor to foreign investors. Our measure is equal 
to the sum of rents from mineral resource and fossil fuel energy depletion divided by 
gross national income, as reported in World Bank (2003b). Rents are estimated as (P–
AC)*R, that is, as price minus average cost multiplied by the amount of resource 
extracted, an amount known as total Hotelling rent in the natural resource economics 
literature. 
There is a long tradition of studies analyzing the effect of political stability and 
institutional quality on FDI inflows (see, for example, Schneider and Frey 1985; 
Alesina and Perotti 1996; Wheeler and Mody 2000; Perry 2000; Globerman and 
Shapiro 2002). We include five different measures of institutional quality in separate 
estimations together with interaction effects with the BIT variable. First, we use the 
political constraints (POLCON) index developed by Henisz (2000). Henisz has 
designed his index as an indicator of the ability of political institutions to make 
credible commitments to an existing policy regime, which he argues is the most 
relevant political variable of interest to investors. Building on a simple spatial model 
of political interaction, the index makes use of the structure of government in a given 
country and the political views represented by the different levels of government (i.e. 
the executive and the lower and upper legislative chambers). It measures the extent to 
which political actors are constrained in their choice of future policies by the 
existence of other political actors with veto power who will have to consent. Using 
18 information on party composition of the executive and the legislative branches allows 
taking into account how alignment across branches of government and the extent of 
preference heterogeneity within each legislative branch impacts the feasibility of 
policy change. Scores range from 0, which indicates that the executive has total 
political discretion and could change existing policies at any point of time, to 1, which 
indicates that a change of existing policies is totally infeasible. Of course, in practice 
agreement is always feasible, so the maximum score is less than 1. 
The remaining measures of institutional quality are all compiled from the 
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), published by the Political Risk Services 
(PRS) Group (www.prsgroup.com). They are the investment profile index, the index 
of government stability, an index of law and order as well as ICRG’s composite 
political risk index. These data are available from 1984 onwards and have the widest 
country coverage of all the sources for country risk ratings. The composite political 
risk index incorporates the other indices. The index varies from 0 (high risk) to 100 
(low risk). The full composite political index or a comparable measure is more 
commonly used in studies investigating the determinants of FDI and BITs than the 
individual sub-components (see for example Alesina and Perotti 1996, Wheeler and 
Mody 1992, UNCTAD 1998, Tobin and Rose-Ackerman 2005). However, as 
mentioned already, it also includes many items that are not strictly speaking relevant 
to institutional quality such as indicators of socioeconomic conditions, measures of 
conflict and ethnic tensions, and measures of military and religious involvement in the 
political process – see appendix 2 for a detailed description of this variable. The 
composite index is therefore strictly speaking not purely a measure of institutional 
quality. For this reason, we also employ the three sub-components most relevant to 
investors and most closely connected to BIT provisions. The investment profile index 
19 varies from 0 to 12, 12 representing very low risk and 0 indicating very high risk. The 
index is made of ratings on 3 separate elements, each receiving equal weight: contract 
viability (risk of expropriation), profit repatriation and payment delays. Similar to the 
investment profile index, the government stability index varies from 0 (high risk) to 
12 (low risk) and is composed of three elements that receive equal weight: 
government unity, legislative strength and popular support. The law and order index 
runs from 0 (worst) to 6 (best) and consists of a law component measuring the 
strength and impartiality of the legal system and an order component measuring the 
extent of popular observance of the law. 
 
(c) Estimation technique 
We estimate both random-effects and fixed-effects models, in which case we can 
employ robust standard errors. We suspect that there are factors making a country 
attractive to foreign investors that are not captured by our explanatory variables and 
that are (approximately) time-invariant, such as colonial history, culture, language, 
climate, geographical distance to the centers of the Western developed world, legal 
restrictions on inward FDI etc. Hausman tests, which test the random-effects 
assumption that these time-invariant factors are uncorrelated with the explanatory 
variables, by and large reject the assumption. We therefore focus on the fixed-effects 
estimation results. To mitigate potential reverse causality problems, we lag all 
explanatory variables by one period. Ideally, one would like to tackle this problem 
more comprehensively with the help of instrumental variable regression. However, 
practically all explanatory variables are potentially subject to reverse causality and it 
would be simply impossible to find adequate and valid instruments. Table 1 provides 
summary descriptive variable information together with a bivariate correlation matrix. 
20 Variance inflation analysis did not suggest reason for concern with multicollinearity 
problems. As in any regressions analysis, there is of course always the possibility of 
omitted variable bias. For example, we cannot account for over-time changes in 
domestic legislation encouraging or discouraging FDI other than what is captured by 
BITs as there is no comprehensive information available. However, we see no reason 
why this or any other potentially omitted variable should be systematically correlated 
with our explanatory variables to an extent that our results would be significantly 
biased. 
< Insert Table 1 around here > 
 
5. RESULTS 
Table 2 presents random-effects estimation results for the logged amount of FDI in 
US$ of 1996 flowing to a country as the dependent variable. Column I starts with 
POLCON as the measure of institutional quality. Most variables test in accordance 
with theoretical expectations. Countries with a higher cumulative number of BITs, 
richer countries with fast-growing economies and larger populations receive more 
FDI. So do countries that are more intensive in natural resource extraction, that are 
members of the WTO and have a higher number of trade agreements with developed 
countries. A higher inflation rate deters FDI. The POLCON variable is statistically 
insignificant. How to interpret this result? With interaction terms included, one cannot 
interpret the coefficients on the individual components in the conventional way. 
Instead, the coefficient on POLCON in a model with a significant interaction term 
BITs*POLCON is the effect of POLCON on FDI when the BIT variable is zero (see 
Braumoeller (2004) for a nice exposition). It follows from our estimations that 
institutional quality as measured by POLCON has no effect on FDI in the absence of 
21 BITs. The interaction term is marginally significant, however, suggesting that 
institutional quality as measured by POLCON and BITs are complements since the 
positive effect of cumulative BIT signature is higher when the POLCON index is high 
as well. 
< Insert Table 2 around here > 
In column II we replace Henisz’s (2000) policy constraints variable with the 
ICRG’s composite political risk index (where higher values on the index mean lower 
risk). Note the significant drop in the number of observations. This is not so much due 
to a loss of countries included in the sample, which drops from 120 to 91, but due to 
the fact that we lose all observations before 1984, the first year for which this variable 
has been coded. Despite the substantial reduction in sample size, the weighted sum of 
BITs variable is statistically significant with the expected positive sign. Results on the 
other variables are also relatively consistent in terms of sign and statistical 
significance of variables, but the trade agreement variables are no longer statistically 
significant. There is one further important further exception: The interaction term 
between institutional quality and our BIT variable is now statistically significant with 
a negative coefficient sign. This would suggest that BITs function as substitutes for 
high domestic institutional quality since the positive effect of cumulative BIT 
signature is higher when the ICRG composite index is low, that is, in high-risk 
environments. Importantly, while the positive effect of BITs on FDI decreases as 
political risk is reduced, the effect always remains positive, even at very low levels of 
risk.
12 In the remaining columns, we replace the ICRG’s composite index with the 
selected individual sub-components. In column III, we look at a country’s investment 
profile, in column IV at a country’s governmental stability and in column V at its 
degree of law and order, respectively. Results are largely consistent with the ones for 
22 the ICRG composite index. Importantly, the weighted cumulative number of signed 
BITs is always statistically significant with the expected positive sign. However, the 
interaction term is not statistically significant for these sub-components of the ICRG 
composite index. The Hausman test fails to reject the random effects assumption only 
in column I, which underlines the importance of controlling for country fixed effects. 
Table 3 therefore reports results from fixed-effects estimation. 
< Insert Table 3 about here > 
Fixed-effects estimation results are rather similar to the ones from random-effects 
estimation with two important exceptions. First, the interaction term between 
POLCON and the BIT variable is now insignificant, whereas the interaction term with 
governmental stability is significant and negative, suggesting that BITs and 
governmental stability function as substitutes. As before, the positive effect of BITs 
on FDI becomes smaller the more stable governments are, but never to an extent that 
the effect would become negative. Second, the log of population size now switches 
signs and is statistically significant with a negative coefficient. Keeping in mind that 
the fixed effects estimation is based on the within-variation of the data in each country 
only, whereas the random effects estimation is based on both cross-country and 
within-variation, this can be interpreted to the effect that countries with larger 
populations receive more FDI conditional on the other explanatory variables, but as a 
country’s population grows, it receives less rather than more FDI conditional on the 
other explanatory variables and the country-specific fixed effects. 
Table 4 presents results for the logged country share of developing country FDI as 
the dependent variable. The reported results are based on fixed-effects estimation, 
since Hausman tests overwhelmingly rejected the random-effects assumption in all 
cases. Results are very, very similar to the ones reported above for the other 
23 dependent variable. In particular, a higher cumulative number of signed BITs is 
associated with a higher share of FDI inflows. So is institutional quality with the 
exception of POLCON. As before, there is some limited evidence that BITs and 
institutional quality are substitutes for each other, but the interaction term is only 
statistically significant with a negative coefficient sign for the composite ICRG index 
and its governmental stability sub-component. 
< Insert Table 4 around here > 
 
6. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
Lagging the explanatory variables by one year mitigates potential simultaneity bias, 
but this lag length is somewhat arbitrary. The positive impact of the BIT variable on 
FDI inflows is maintained if the lag length is two, three or four years instead.
13 Tobin 
and Rose-Ackerman (2005) use five-year period averages to avoid the impact of year-
to-year variation. Maintaining a lag of one year, but averaging the data over five-year 
periods does not dramatically change our results as the fixed-effects estimation results 
reported in table 5 attest to, with the share of developing country FDI inflow as the 
dependent variable. With less variation in the data, we are not surprised to find that 
some variables lose statistical significance. Importantly, however, the BIT variable 
remains statistically significant with the expected positive sign throughout. The 
institutional variables and interaction terms also test almost as before in terms of sign 
and whether they are statistically significantly different from zero. The exception is 
the interaction between the BIT variable and governmental stability, which is only 
marginally insignificant, however. 
< Insert Table 5 around here > 
24 In further non-reported sensitivity analysis, we briefly explored the issue of 
whether BITs are all about a signaling effect. Maybe the only thing that matters is that 
a developing country has signed one BIT (perhaps with a major capital exporter) and 
signing any more BITs has no additional effect. When we added a dummy variable 
that is set to one in case a developing country has signed a BIT with any developed 
country, then this dummy variable was statistically significant with the expected 
positive sign. However, as before, the weighted cumulative sum of BITs remained 
positive and statistically significant as well with its magnitude only slightly reduced. 
This remains true if we replace the dummy variable with one for BITs signed with 
any of the six major capital exporters, namely France, Germany, Japan, the 
Netherlands, the UK and the US. We interpret this as further evidence that BITs are 
likely to fulfill the dual function of both signaling and commitment. 
Next, we checked whether our main results are due to the presence of problematic 
countries. In particular, we excluded all Eastern European and former Soviet Union 
countries from the sample since, with the exception of Hungary, these countries do 
not seem to be included in the analysis by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005). 
However, results hardly change. We also excluded countries with a population size of 
less than one million from the sample to eliminate the influence of very small 
countries, but the results were hardly affected. We even restricted the list of countries 
to be exactly the same as in Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) and still found a 
positive effect of BITs on FDI throughout, with one exception (investment profile as 
measure of institutional quality), in which case the BIT variable is marginally 
insignificant with a positive coefficient sign. This holds true both in the annual and in 
the five-year period model specification. 
25 Next, we wanted to test more formally whether results are driven by a few 
influential outliers. Belsley, Kuh and Welsch (1980) suggest that observations that 
have both high residuals and a high leverage deserve special attention. We excluded 
an observation if its so-called DFITS is greater than twice the square root of (k/n), 
where k is the number of independent variables and n the number of observations. 
DFITS is defined as the square root of (hi/(1-hi)), where hi is an observation’s 
leverage, multiplied by its studentized residual. Applying this criterion leads to the 
exclusion of up to 385 observations. Results are remarkably consistent, however. 
In further sensitivity analysis, we also included a measure of trade openness, 
which has a theoretically ambiguous effect on FDI (Taylor 2000). On one hand, 
countries that are more open to trade can be more attractive host countries if the main 
purpose of foreign investment is to export the goods or services produced. On the 
other hand, high trade barriers could make it in a company’s best interest to locate 
production within the host country in order to circumvent the import barriers. Trade 
openness tested sometimes insignificant, sometimes (marginally) significant with a 
negative coefficient sign in the estimations, hardly affecting the results of the other 
variables. Since its inclusion would reduce the sample size by about 20 countries, we 
did not include this variable in the reported estimations. Following Noorbakhsh, 
Paloni and Youssef (2001), we also included the secondary enrollment ratio to 
account for human capital as a determinant of FDI in non-reported analysis. The 
number of observations dropped substantially, leaving results for the other variables 
mainly unaffected. The enrollment ratio itself is never statistically significant, even 
though it is positively signed in line with expectations. 
 
26 7. CONCLUSION 
Developing countries that sign more BITs with developed countries receive more FDI 
inflows. The effect is robust to various sample sizes, model specifications and 
whether or not FDI flows are normalized by the total flow of FDI going to developing 
countries. There is some limited evidence that BITs function as substitutes for 
institutional quality, as in a few estimations the interaction term between the 
accumulated number of BIT variable and institutional quality is negative and 
statistically significant. The message to developing countries therefore is that 
succumbing to the obligations of BITs does have the desired payoff of higher FDI 
inflows. To our knowledge, ours is the first study to provide robust empirical 
evidence that BITs fulfill their stated objective. Those with particularly poor domestic 
institutional quality possibly stand most to gain from BITs, but there is no robust and 
consistent evidence for this. 
Why do we come to different conclusions than the three other relevant studies? 
Halward-Driemeier’s (2003) study does not allow for a signaling effect and suffers 
from a small non-representative sample due to the dyadic research design. Salacuse 
and Sullivan’s (2005) analysis is cross-sectional and therefore cannot detect how a 
higher number of BITs raises the flow of FDI to signatory developing countries over 
time. The difference to the results presented by Tobin and Rose-Ackerman (2005) is 
more puzzling. As we noted in the sensitivity analysis, our results uphold if we adopt 
their five-year period-averages approach and restrict the list of countries to be exactly 
the same as in their analysis. It is therefore difficult to know where the difference 
comes from. One possibility is that we do not log the number of BITs, not least 
because the log of zero (BITs) is not defined. Whatever the cause, we find Tobin and 
Rose-Ackerman’s (2005) result that each additional BIT lowers (rather than raises) 
27 the flow of FDI to developing countries with high political risk as extremely difficult 
to believe. BITs might not raise FDI flows in contexts of high risk, but there is no 
reason whatsoever to expect that they should lower FDI flows. 
Statistical significance is not equivalent to substantive importance. We therefore 
need to know how strong is the effect of the BIT variable on FDI flows. How much 
more FDI can a developing country expect if it aggressively engages in a program to 
sign BITs with developed countries? To answer this question, we look at a one 
standard deviation increase in the BIT variable (equivalent to an increase of around 27 
in the weighted cumulative BIT variable running from 0 to 99). Since in some 
regressions the interaction effect between the BIT variable and institutional quality is 
statistically significant, the overall effect of signing up to BITs sometimes depends on 
the level of institutional quality, in which case for simplicity we fix institutional 
quality at its median.
14 Based on the estimations in table 3, a country experiencing a 
one standard deviation increase in the BIT variable, is predicted to increase its FDI 
inflow by between 43.7 and 93.2 per cent. Based on the results from table 4, such a 
country is predicted to increase its share of FDI inflow relative to the total inflow to 
developing countries by between 42.0 and 104.1 per cent. Clearly, these are non-
negligible increases following a substantial increase in BIT activity. But whether the 
demonstrated benefits of signing up to BITs in the form of increased FDI inflows are 
higher than the substantial costs developing countries incur in negotiating, signing, 
concluding and complying with the obligations typically contained in such treaties is 
impossible to tell. What we do know is that BITs fulfill their purpose and those 
developing countries that have signed more BITs with major capital exporting 
developed countries are likely to have received more FDI in return. 
28 NOTES 
                                                 
1 For the purpose of this article, we presume that a higher FDI inflow is beneficial to the host nation. 
This presumption can of course be contested (De Soysa and Oneal 1999). 
2 Expropriations without prompt, adequate and effective compensation took also place in many 
Communist countries after the Second World War. 
3 When developed countries tried to extend these restrictions in the context of a multilateral agreement 
on investment (MAI) in the mid-1990s to banning pre-investment restrictions, performance 
requirements and to extending the measures of expropriation requiring compensation to indirect and de 
facto (as opposed to direct) expropriation, most developing countries were rather happy when these 
negotiations imploded under the mounting critique of civil society and internal differences among 
developed countries (Neumayer 2001). Many developed countries were also not too keen on granting 
liberalized access to investors from other developed countries the same way they normally expect 
developing countries to grant to investors from their own countries. 
4 Depending on the BIT, this can refer to the country of the company’s incorporation, seat, registered 
office, or principal place of business or the nationality of the individuals who have control over, or a 
substantial interest in, the investing company (Salacuse and Sullivan 2005, p. 82). 
5 A fourth study is provided by UNCTAD (1998). However, it is based on a purely cross-sectional 
stepwise (!) regression analysis with an unspecified number of observations from 1995. Not 
surprisingly, such ‘garbage can’ modelling leads to inconclusive results. 
6 Their study also suffers from the absence of year-specific time dummies controlling for aggregate 
annual changes in US FDI outflows, which could mean that the results are spurious. 
7 If we were to take the share a developing country receives relative to the sum of global FDI instead, 
then results are practically identical. 
8 In future research we would like to analyze BITs in more detail. Not all BITs are the same and one 
would like to know whether it is certain elements in BITs that matter for FDI location more than others. 
9 This is unsurprising given the high correlation between the weighted and unweighted cumulative 
count of BITs, which follows from the fact that by and large minor capital exporting developed 
countries have signed few BITs, whereas the opposite is the case for major capital exporters. 
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10 Note that replacing logged population with the log of total GDP leads to identical result, which 
follows from the fact that the two variables plus the log of GDP per capita are not independent of each 
other. 
11 We do not include the Lomé Conventions or the follow-on Cotonou Agreement between the EU and 
77 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) since it is highly unlikely that these had 
a major impact on FDI. 
12 Since the coefficient of the BIT variable represents the effect of BITs when the value of institutional 
quality is zero, one can re-scale the institutional quality variable such that zero represents the lowest 
level of risk. At the lowest observed level of risk in the sample, the positive effect of BITs is reduced 
from 0.030 (at the highest observed level of risk in the sample) to 0.011. 
13 All results that are not explicitly reported are available on request. 
14 Strictly speaking, the coefficient of the BIT variable always represents the effect of BITs at a zero 
value of the institutional quality measure, but if the interaction term is not statistically significantly 
different from zero, then, as a first approximation, it can be taken as the effect of BITs at any value of 
institutional quality. 
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4 Table 1. Descriptive statistical variable information and bivariate correlation matrix. 
 
Variable Obs Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
ln FDI flow  2767 3.92 2.52 -4.69  10.78 
ln FDI flow share  2767 -7.06 2.45 -16.98  -1.17 
BITs 2767 23.97 26.98 0  99.34 
ln GDP p.c.  2767 7.93 0.83 5.64  9.72 
ln Population  2767 15.72 1.88 10.62  20.99 
Econ. Growth  2767 0.01 0.07 -0.42  0.78 
Inflation 2767 65.78 684.46 -31.52  26762.02 
Resource rents  2767 5.55 9.76 0  66.60 
Bilateral trade agreements  2767 0.07 0.26 0  2 
WTO membership  2767 0.67 0.47 0  1 
POLCON 2767 0.18 0.20 0  0.67 
Composite political risk  1331 58.71 14.27 11.50  94.17 
Investment profile  1351 6.03 1.91 1  11.13 
Government stability   1350 6.88 2.32 1  12 
Law and order  1349 3.09 1.27 0  6 
 
5  
                          I II III IV V VI VI VIII IX X XI XII XIII  XIV XV
I: ln FDI flow share  1.00                             
II: ln FDI flow  0.95  1.00                           
III:  BITs                      
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
                               
                     
0.41  0.28  1.00
IV: ln GDP p.c.  0.49  0.48  0.31  1.00                       
V:  ln  Population 0.43 0.45 0.21 -0.02 1.00
VI:  Econ.  Growth 0.16 0.15 0.08 0.13 0.07 1.00
VII:  Inflation -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.07 0.02 -0.16 1.00
VIII:  Resource  rents 0.09 0.14 -0.12 0.13 0.07 -0.04 0.02 1.00
IX: Bilateral trade agreements  0.21  0.15  0.30  0.30  0.05  0.03  -0.03  0.04  1.00             
X:  WTO  membership 0.07 0.02 0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.21 -0.09 1.00
XI:  POLCON 0.36 0.28 0.16 0.41 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 -0.13 0.08 0.19 1.00
XII:  Investment  profile 0.38 0.23 0.26 0.33 0.04 0.14 -0.12 -0.08 0.22 0.18 0.29 1.00
XIIII: Government stability   0.31  0.19  0.25  0.29  -0.02 0.14 -0.15 -0.09 0.20 0.20 0.24 0.49 1.00
XIV: Law and order  0.35  0.17  0.37  0.28  0.07  0.15  -0.12  0.00  0.23  0.04  0.18  0.58  0.68  1.00  
XV: Composite political risk  0.40  0.28  0.28  0.38  0.03  0.15  -0.10  -0.05  0.24  0.03  0.22  0.58  0.35  0.46 1.00
 
6 Table 2. Random-effects estimation results (logged FDI flows in 1996 dollars). 
 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
BITs  0.015 0.031 0.012 0.020 0.020 
  (5.34)*** (3.79)***  (2.17)**  (3.66)*** (3.96)*** 
ln  GDP  p.c.  0.548 0.265 0.238 0.294 0.245 
 (5.53)***  (1.68)*  (1.50)  (1.86)*  (1.64)* 
ln  Population  0.506 0.594 0.626 0.610 0.625 
  (10.27)***  (6.98)*** (7.24)*** (7.08)*** (7.96)*** 
Econ.  growth  1.195 1.683 1.553 1.602 1.597 
  (2.52)** (2.42)** (2.19)** (2.25)** (2.26)** 
Inflation  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (2.07)**  (1.73)*  (1.46)  (1.65)*  (1.64) 
Resource  rents  0.025 0.030 0.023 0.022 0.021 
  (4.34)*** (3.61)*** (2.76)*** (2.62)*** (2.59)*** 
Bilateral  trade  agreements  0.343 0.278 0.160 0.344 0.288 
  (1.83)*  (1.34) (0.72) (1.56) (1.34) 
WTO membership  0.212  -0.018  -0.024  0.066  0.137 
  (1.98)**  (0.12) (0.16) (0.44) (0.92) 
POLCON  0.350      
  (1.17)      
BITs*POLCON  0.012      
  (1.78)*      
Composite Political Risk    0.011       
    (1.81)*     
BITs*Comp. Pol. Risk    -0.0002       
    (1.73)*     
Investment  profile     0.091    
     (2.16)**    
BITs*Inv.  profile     0.001    
     (1.08)    
Government  stability       0.091  
       (2.34)**  
BITs*Gov. stability        -0.001   
       (0.77)  
Law  and  order       0.247 
       (3.56)*** 
BITs*Law and order          -0.001 
       ( 0 . 8 7 )  
Observations  2767 1346 1369 1368 1367 
Countries  120  91 91 91 91 
Period  1970-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 
R-squared  (overall)  0.46 0.49 0.50 0.49 0.51 











Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses. Year-specific time dummies included, but 
coefficients not reported. Hausman test is asymptotically χ
2 distributed with p-values 
in brackets. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
7 Table 3. Fixed-effects estimation results (logged FDI flows in 1996 dollars). 
 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
BITs  0.016 0.033 0.015 0.025 0.020 
  (4.23)*** (3.68)*** (2.93)*** (4.52)*** (3.98)*** 
ln  GDP  p.c.  1.916 3.771 3.304 4.052 3.691 
  (4.04)*** (4.37)*** (3.60)*** (4.47)*** (4.21)*** 
ln  Population  -1.344 -4.942 -4.513 -5.176 -5.033 
  (2.66)*** (5.21)*** (4.51)*** (5.19)*** (5.24)*** 
Econ.  growth  1.134 2.372 2.366 2.343 2.464 
  (1.81)*  (3.35)*** (3.13)*** (3.12)*** (3.24)*** 
Inflation  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (3.16)***  (2.36)** (2.18)** (2.41)** (2.48)** 
Resource  rents  0.030 0.036 0.031 0.031 0.028 
  (3.63)***  (2.96)***  (2.41)** (2.47)** (2.16)** 
Bilateral  trade  agreements  0.532 0.119 0.061 0.289 0.199 
  (2.17)**  (0.66) (0.32) (1.44) (1.02) 
WTO membership  0.218  -0.081  -0.111  -0.047  0.027 
  (1.98)**  (0.52) (0.73) (0.31) (0.18) 
POLCON  0.233      
  (0.71)      
BITs*POLCON  0.011      
  (1.29)      
Composite Political Risk    0.014       
    (2.05)**     
BITs*Comp. Pol. Risk    -0.0003       
    (2.17)**     
Investment  profile     0.117    
     (2.84)***    
BITs*Inv.  profile     -0.000    
     (0.01)    
Government  stability       0.128  
       (2.88)***  
BITs*Gov. stability        -0.001   
       (2.12)**  
Law  and  order       0.290 
       (4.13)*** 
BITs*Law and order          -0.002 
       ( 1 . 1 4 )  
Observations  2767 1346 1369 1368 1367 
Countries  120  91 91 91 91 
Period  1970-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 
R-squared  (within)  0.22 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 
 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses. Year-specific time dummies included, but 
coefficients not reported. Robust standard errors. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
8 Table 4. Fixed-effects estimation results (logged FDI flows as share of developing 
country FDI). 
 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
BITs  0.013 0.035 0.018 0.027 0.023 
  (3.47)*** (4.04)*** (3.33)*** (5.02)*** (4.65)*** 
ln  GDP  p.c.  3.008 1.916 1.754 2.144 2.047 
  (10.10)***  (3.13)*** (3.03)*** (3.42)*** (3.52)*** 
ln  Population  -2.613 -2.686 -2.654 -2.864 -2.844 
  (11.45)***  (5.13)*** (5.66)*** (5.37)*** (5.98)*** 
Econ.  growth  1.334 2.268 2.348 2.225 2.146 
  (2.15)**  (3.18)*** (3.06)*** (2.93)*** (2.81)*** 
Inflation  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (3.27)***  (2.33)** (2.10)** (2.38)** (2.53)** 
Resource  rents  0.027 0.032 0.027 0.028 0.027 
  (3.47)***  (2.70)***  (2.18)** (2.24)** (2.18)** 
Bilateral  trade  agreements  0.539 0.216 0.113 0.343 0.302 
  (2.25)** (1.29)  (0.60)  (1.82)* (1.65)* 
WTO membership  0.133  -0.049  -0.075  -0.017  0.031 
  (1.26) (0.31) (0.49) (0.11) (0.20) 
POLCON  0.184      
  (0.57)      
BITs*POLCON  0.008      
  (0.96)      
Composite Political Risk    0.013       
    (2.00)**     
BITs*Comp. Pol. Risk    -0.0003       
    (2.04)**     
Investment  profile     0.108    
     (2.69)***    
BITs*Inv.  profile     -0.000    
     (0.02)    
Government  stability       0.104  
       (2.59)***  
BITs*Gov. stability        -0.001   
       (2.11)**  
Law  and  order       0.231 
       (3.36)*** 
BITs*Law and order          -0.002 
       ( 1 . 2 0 )  
Observations  2767 1346 1369 1368 1367 
Countries  120  91 91 91 91 
Period  1970-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 
R-squared  (within)  0.09 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.07 
 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses. Robust standard errors. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
9 Table 5. Five-year period averages fixed-effects estimation results (logged FDI flows 
as share of developing country FDI). 
 
 I  II  III  IV  V 
BITs  0.014 0.048 0.030 0.042 0.034 
  (2.15)**  (3.80)*** (2.91)*** (4.16)*** (3.68)*** 
ln  GDP  p.c.  3.036 1.948 1.792 2.099 1.957 
  (6.47)***  (2.33)** (2.17)** (2.39)** (2.47)** 
ln  Population  -2.601 -2.766 -2.702 -2.849 -2.944 
  (6.92)*** (3.50)*** (3.63)*** (3.58)*** (4.25)*** 
Econ.  growth  4.337 3.488 3.300 3.564 4.014 
  (2.14)**  (1.21) (1.03) (1.11) (1.29) 
Inflation  -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
  (1.95)*  (0.97) (1.06) (1.21) (1.23) 
Resource  rents  0.029 0.039 0.042 0.045 0.045 
  (1.94)* (1.55) (1.69)*  (1.90)*  (1.84)* 
Bilateral  trade  agreements  1.112 0.482 0.336 0.634 0.530 
  (2.26)**  (1.33) (0.79) (1.50) (1.38) 
WTO  membership  0.242 -0.245 -0.231 -0.146 -0.099 
  (1.17) (0.82) (0.77) (0.49) (0.34) 
POLCON  -0.066      
  (0.10)      
BITs*POLCON  0.008      
  (0.49)      
Composite Political Risk    0.020       
    (1.72)*     
BITs*Comp. Pol. Risk    -0.000       
    (1.79)*     
Investment  profile     0.138    
     (1.64)*    
BITs*Inv.  profile     -0.001    
     (0.37)    
Government  stability       0.127  
       (1.71)*   
BITs*Gov. stability        -0.002   
       (1.61)  
Law  and  order       0.341 
       (3.01)*** 
BITs*Law and order          -0.002 
       ( 0 . 9 1 )  
Observations  637 317 314 314 314 
Countries  120  91 91 91 91 
Period  1970-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 1984-2001 
R-squared  (within)  0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.21 
 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses. Robust standard errors. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Source: UNCTAD (2003b). 
11 Appendix 1. List of countries included in sample. 
 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina 
Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Czech Republic, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gabon, Gambia, 
Georgia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, 
Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, 
Korea (Rep.), Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Lithuania, Macedonia 
FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, 
Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russian 
Federation, Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, 
Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Swaziland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, 
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
12 Appendix 2. ICRG’s Composite Political Risk Index. 
 
POLITICAL RISK COMPONENTS 
Sequence Component Max.  points 
A Government  Stability  12 
B Socioeconomic  Conditions  12 
C Investment  Profile  12 
D Internal  Conflict  12 
E External  Conflict  12 
F Corruption  6 
G  Military in Politics  6 
H  Religion in Politics  6 
I  Law and Order  6 
J Ethnic  Tensions  6 
K Democratic  Accountability  6 
L Bureaucracy  Quality  4 
Total   100 
 
Source: www.prsgroup.com 
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